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Abstract
Well-designed interfaces use procedural and sensory cues to increase the salience of appropriate actions and
intentions. However, empirical studies suggest that cognitive load can inﬂuence the strength of procedural
and sensory cues. We formalise the relationship between salience and cognitive load revealed by empirical
data. We add these rules to our abstract cognitive architecture developed for the veriﬁcation of usability
properties. The interface of a ﬁre engine dispatch task used in the empirical studies is then formally veriﬁed
to assess the salience and load rules. Finally, we discuss how the formal modelling and veriﬁcation suggests
further reﬁnements of the rules derived from the informal analysis of empirical data.
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1 Introduction
The correctness of interactive systems depends on the behaviour of both human and
computer actors. Human behaviour cannot be fully captured by a formal model.
However, it is a reasonable, and useful, approximation to assume that humans
behave “rationally”: entering interactions with goals and domain knowledge likely
to help them achieve their goals. If problems are discovered resulting from rational
behaviour then such problems are liable to be systematic and deserve attention in
the design. Whole classes of persistent, systematic user errors may occur due to
modelable cognitive causes [16,11]. Often opportunities for making such errors can
be reduced with good design [6]. A methodology for highlighting those designs that
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allow users to make systematic errors, even when behaving in a rational way, is
important. It will allow such designs to be signiﬁcantly improved.
Well-designed interfaces increase the sensory salience of signals that are used to
cue actions that are frequently forgotten or are performed in the wrong sequence.
Chung and Byrne [8] found that a sensory signal has to be highly visually salient
in order to ensure that a task-critical step, buried deep down in the task structure,
is not forgotten. The speciﬁcity of the cue is important. Making a target action
more salient by moving it to an area of the interface which is likely to be the focus
of attention is often insuﬃcient. The cue has to be indicative of the type of action
required – e.g., a red ﬂashing arrow pointing at the button to be clicked. Low level
perceptual studies [7] have shown that an individual is unable to process visually
salient features if cognitive control functions are not available to maintain the active
goal. This suggests that sensory cues are not always noticed under high workload
scenarios.
Non-sensory cues, known as procedural cues (internal to the cognitive system),
can be used to retrieve previously formulated intentions (expert procedural knowl-
edge) enabling the next procedural step to be performed. Remembering that, and
so doing, after performing x always do y if z is true is an example of following a
procedural cue rule. Sensory cues (external to the cognitive system) can also be
used to retrieve intentions (expert procedural knowledge). For example, if sensory
cue p is attended to then it may indicate that q should be the next step if r is true.
People make slip errors frequently, but do not make them every time. Empiri-
cal studies [1] suggest that cognitive load can inﬂuence the frequency of errors by
aﬀecting the strength of procedural and sensory cues. In this paper, we formalise
the relationship between salience and cognitive load revealed by the informal anal-
ysis of empirical data. We then incorporate these rules into our abstract cognitive
architecture [9,17] developed earlier from abstract cognitive principles, such as a
user entering an interaction with knowledge of the task and its subsidiary goals,
and choosing non-deterministically between appropriate actions. This extension re-
ﬁnes non-determinism by introducing a hierarchy of choices governed by the salience
(strength) of procedural and sensory cues, and the level of cognitive load imposed
by the task performed.
As an assessment step for our extension, we formally model the ﬁre engine dis-
patch task used in the empirical studies [1]. One reason for doing this is to check
whether the systematic errors identiﬁed during the experiments can also be de-
tected by the formal veriﬁcation of the same task, thus indicating that our extended
cognitive architecture generates behaviours corresponding to those of real people.
Another reason is that possible mismatches between the two sets of behaviours can
suggest new empirical studies leading to reﬁnements of our salience and load rules
and their formalisation within the cognitive architecture.
Contribution
Summarising, the main contribution of this paper is the following:
• An investigation into the formal modelling of salience and cognitive load.
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• A formalisation of the connection between salience and cognitive load revealed
by empirical studies.
• An extension of our veriﬁcation framework involving salience and load rules, and
a hierarchy of salience levels.
• A formal modelling, as an assessment step, of the task used earlier in our empirical
studies.
Related work
There is little related work on salience and cognitive load. Cartwright-Finch and
Lavie [7] developed a theory that a high extraneous load only reduces perception
of a sensory cue when cognitive control functions are not available to maintain the
active goal. More generally, work on human error has shown that the provision
of visual cues can strengthen procedural cueing providing they manage to capture
attention [8].
Duke et al. [10], and Bowman and Faconti [4] use Interactive Cognitive Sub-
systems (ICS) [3] as the underlying model of human information processing. Their
models deal with information ﬂow between the diﬀerent cognitive subsystems and
constraints on the associated transformation processes. As a result, the above work
focusses on reasoning about multi-modal interfaces and analyses whether interfaces
based on several simultaneous modes of interaction are compatible with the capa-
bilities of human cognition.
In the related area of safety-critical systems, Rushby et al. [19] focus on mode
errors and the ability of pilots to track mode changes. They formalise plausible
mental models of systems and analyse them using the Murφ veriﬁcation tool. The
mental models though are essentially abstracted system models; they do not rely
upon structure provided by cognitive principles.
2 Cognitive Architecture
Our cognitive architecture is a higher-order logic formalisation of abstract principles
of cognition and speciﬁes a form of cognitively plausible behaviour [5]. The archi-
tecture speciﬁes possible user behaviour (traces of actions) that can be justiﬁed
in terms of speciﬁc results from the cognitive sciences. Real users can act outside
this behaviour of course, about which the architecture says nothing. However, be-
haviour deﬁned by the architecture can be regarded as potentially systematic, and
so erroneous behaviour is similarly systematic in the design. The predictive power
of the architecture is bounded by the situations where people act according to the
principles speciﬁed. The architecture allows one to investigate what happens if a
person acts in such plausible ways. The behaviour deﬁned is neither “correct” nor
“incorrect”. It could be either depending on the environment and task in question.
We do not attempt to model the underlying neural architecture nor the higher-
level cognitive architecture such as information processing. Instead our model is an
abstract speciﬁcation, intended for ease of reasoning.
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2.1 Cognitive Principles
In the formal user model, we rely upon abstract cognitive principles that give a
knowledge level description in the terms of Newell [15]. Their focus is on the internal
goals and knowledge of a user. These principles are brieﬂy discussed below. Their
formalisation in SAL is described in Sections 2.2 and 3.
Non-determinism
In any situation, any one of several cognitively plausible behaviours might be
taken. It cannot be assumed that any speciﬁc plausible behaviour will be the one
that a person will follow where there are alternatives.
Relevance
Presented with several options, a person chooses one that seems relevant to the
task goals. For example, if the user goal is to get cash from an ATM, it would
be cognitively implausible to choose the option allowing one to change a PIN. A
person could of course press the wrong button by accident. Such classes of error
are beyond the scope of our approach, focussing as it does on systematic slips.
Salience
Even though user choices are non-deterministic, they are aﬀected by the salience
of possible actions. For example, taking money released by a cash-point is a more
salient, and thus much more likely, action to take than to terminate the interaction
by walking away from the machine without cash. In general, salience could be
aﬀected by several factors such as the sensory (visual) salience of an action, its
procedural cueing as a part of a learned task, and the cognitive load imposed by
the complexity of the task performed.
Mental versus physical actions
There is a delay between the moment a person mentally commits to taking an
action (either due to the internal goals or as a response to the interface prompts)
and the moment when the corresponding physical action is taken. To capture
the consequences of this delay, each physical action modelled is associated with
an internal mental action that commits to taking it. Once a signal has been sent
from the brain to the motor system to take an action, it cannot be revoked after a
certain point even if the person becomes aware that it is wrong before the action
is taken. To reﬂect this, we assume that a physical action immediately follows the
committing action.
Pre-determined goals
A user enters an interaction with knowledge of the task and, in particular, task
dependent sub-goals that must be discharged. These sub-goals might concern infor-
mation that must be communicated to the device or items (such as bank cards) that
must be inserted into the device. Given the opportunity, people may attempt to
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Table 1
A fragment of the SAL language
Notation Meaning
x:T x has type T
λ(x:T):e a function of x with the value e
x′ = e an update: the new value of x is that of e
{x:T | p(x)} a subset of T such that the predicate p(x) holds
a[i] the i-th element of the array a
r.x the ﬁeld x of the record r
r WITH .x := e the record r with its ﬁeld x updated by e
g → upd if g is true then update according to upd
c [] d non-deterministic choice between c and d
[](i:T):ci non-deterministic choice between ci with i in range T
discharge such goals, even when the device is prompting for a diﬀerent action. Such
pre-determined goals represent a partial plan that has arisen from knowledge of the
task in hand, independent of the environment in which that task is performed. No
ﬁxed order other than a goal hierarchy is assumed over how pre-determined goals
will be discharged.
Reactive behaviour
Users may react to an external stimulus, doing the action suggested by the
stimulus. For example, if a ﬂashing light comes on a user might, if the light is
noticed, react by inserting coins in an adjacent slot.
Voluntary task completion
A person may decide to terminate the interaction. As soon as the main task
goal has been achieved, users intermittently, but persistently, terminate interactions
[6], even if subsidiary tasks generated in achieving the main goal have not been
completed. A cash-point example is a person walking away with the cash but
leaving the card. Users also may terminate interactions when the signals from the
device or environment suggest that task continuation is impossible due to some
fault. For example, if the cash-point signals that the inserted card is invalid (and
therefore retained), a person is likely to walk away and try to contact their bank.
Forced task termination
If there is no apparent action that a person can take that will help to complete
the task then the person is forced to terminate the interaction. For example, if, on
a ticket machine, the user wishes to buy a weekly season ticket, but the options pre-
sented include nothing about season tickets, then the person will give up, assuming
the goal is not achievable.
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TRANSITION
[](g:GoalRange,slc:Salience): CommitAction:
NOT(comm) ∧
finished = notf ∧
(HighestSalience(slc, g, status, goals, ...)
∨
HighSalience(slc, g, status, goals, ...) ∧
NOT(∃h : HighestSalience(LowSLC, h, status, goals, ...)
∨
LowSalience(slc, g, status, goals, ...) ∧
NOT(∃h : (HighSalience(LowSLC, h, status, goals, ...) ∨
HighestSalience(LowSLC, h, status, goals, ...))) ∧
(g = ExitGoal ∨ MayExit)
→
commit′[act(Goals[g].subgoals)] =
committed;
status′ = status
WITH .trace[g] := TRUE
WITH .last := g
WITH .length :=
status.length + 1
[]
[](a:ActionRange): PerformAction:
commit[a] = committed →
commit′ [a] = ready;
Transition(a)
[]
ExitTask:
goals[TopGoal].achieved(in, mem) ∧
BrokenState(in, mem, env) ∧
NOT(comm) ∧
finished = notf
→ finished′ = ok
[]
Abort:
NOT(ExistsSalient(...)) ∧
NOT(goals[TopGoal].achieved(in, mem)) ∧
NOT(comm) ∧
finished = notf
→
finished′ = IF Wait(in, mem)
THEN notf
ELSE abort ENDIF
[]
Idle:
finished = notf →
Fig. 1. Cognitive architecture in SAL (simpliﬁed)
2.2 Cognitive Architecture in SAL
We have formalised the cognitive principles within the SAL environment [14]. It
provides a higher-order speciﬁcation language and tools for analysing state ma-
chines speciﬁed as parametrised modules and composed either synchronously or
asynchronously. The SAL notation we use here is given in Table 1. We also use the
usual notation for the conjunction, disjunction and set membership operators. A
simpliﬁed version of the SAL speciﬁcation of a transition relation that deﬁnes our
user model is given in Fig. 1, where predicates in italic are shorthands explained
later on. Below, whilst explaining this speciﬁcation (SAL module User), we also
discuss how it reﬂects our cognitive principles.
Guarded commands
SAL speciﬁcations are transition systems. Non-determinism is represented
by the non-deterministic choice, [], between the named guarded commands
(i.e. transitions). For example, CommitAction in Fig. 1 is the name of a family of
transitions indexed by g. Each guarded command in the speciﬁcation describes an
action that a user could plausibly take. The pairs CommitAction – PerformAction of
the corresponding transitions reﬂect the connection between the physical and men-
tal actions. The ﬁrst of the pair models committing to a goal, the second actually
taking the corresponding action (see below).
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Goals structure
The main concept in our cognitive architecture is that of user goals. 5 User goals
are organised as a hierarchical (tree like) goal–subgoals structure. The nodes of this
tree are either compound or atomic:
atomic Goals at the bottom of the structure (tree leaves) are atomic: they consist
of (map to) an action, for example, a device action.
compound All other goals are compound: they are modelled as a set of task
subgoals.
In this paper, we consider an essentially ﬂat goal structure with the top goal con-
sisting of atomic subgoals only. We will explore the potential for using hierarchical
goal structures in subsequent work.
In SAL, user goals are modelled as an array, Goals, which is a parameter of the
User module. Each element g in Goals is a record with the following ﬁelds:
guard A predicate, denoted grd, that speciﬁes when the goal g is enabled, for
example, due to the relevant device prompts.
choice A predicate (choice strategy), denoted choice, that models a high-level
ordering of goals by specifying when the goal g can be chosen. An example of the
choice strategy is: “choose only if g has not been chosen before.”
achieved A predicate, denoted achieved, that speciﬁes the main task goal when
g is the top goal, not used for atomic goals.
salience A value, denoted slc, that speciﬁes the sensory salience of g.
cueing A function, denoted cue, that for each goal h returns the strength of g as
a procedural cue for h.
load A value, denoted load, that speciﬁes the intrinsic load associated with the
execution of g.
subgoals A data structure, denoted subgoals, that speciﬁes the subgoals of the
goal. It takes the form comp(gls) when the goal consists of a set of subgoals
gls. If the goal is atomic, its subgoals are represented by a reference, denoted
atom(act) to an action in the array Actions (see below).
Goal execution
To see how the execution of an atomic goal is modelled in SAL consider the
guarded command PerformAction for doing a user action that has been previously
committed to:
commit[a] = committed →
commit′[a] = ready;
Transition(a)
The left-hand side of → is the guard of this command. It says that the rule will
only activate if the associated action has already been committed to, as indicated
by the element a of the local variable array commit holding value committed. If the
5 Note that we are omitting from the description of the goal structure some aspects related to the relevance
and timing of goals. They are not used in the work described here; for the omitted detail see [18].
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rule is then non-deterministically chosen to ﬁre, this value is changed to ready to
indicate there are now no commitments to physical actions outstanding and the user
model can select another goal. Finally, Transition(a) represents the state updates
associated with this particular action a.
The state space of the user model consists of three parts: input variable in,
output variable out, and global variable (memory) mem; the environment is modelled
by a global variable, env. All of these are speciﬁed using type variables and are
instantiated for each concrete interactive system. The state updates associated with
an atomic goal are speciﬁed as an action. The latter is modelled as a record with the
ﬁelds tout, tmem and tenv; the array Actions is a collection of all user actions. The
three ﬁelds are relations from old to new states that describe how two components
of the user model state (outputs out and memory mem) and environment env are
updated by executing this action. These relations, provided when the generic user
model is instantiated, are used to specify Transition(a) as follows:
out′ ∈ {x:Out | Actions[a].tout(in,out,mem)(x)};
mem′ ∈ {x:Memory | Actions[a].tmem(in,mem,out′)(x)};
env′ ∈ {x:Env | Actions[a].tenv(in,mem,env)(x) ∧ possessions}
Since we are modelling the cognitive aspects of user actions, all three state up-
dates depend on the initial values of inputs (perceptions) and memory. In addition,
each update depends on the old value of the component updated. The memory
update also depends on the new value (out′) of the outputs, since we usually as-
sume the user remembers the actions just taken. The update of env must also
satisfy a generic relation, possessions. It speciﬁes universal physical constraints on
possessions and their value, linking the events of taking and giving up a possession
item with the corresponding increase or decrease in the number (counter) of items
possessed. For example, it speciﬁes that if an item is not given up then the user still
has it. The counters of possession items are modelled as environment components.
PerformAction is enabled by executing the guarded command for selecting an
atomic goal, CommitAction, which switches the commit ﬂag for some action a to
committed thus committing to this action (enabling PerformAction). A goal g may
be selected only when one of the disjuncts specifying its salience level (see Section 3)
is true. The last conjunct in the guard of CommitAction distinguishes the cases
when the selected goal is ExitGoal or not. ExitGoal (given as a parameter of the
User module) represents such options as “cancel” or “exit”, available in some form
in most interactive systems. We omit the deﬁnition of MayExit from Fig. 1 here,
since it is irrelevant for this paper.
When an atomic goal g is selected, the user model commits to the corresponding
action act(Goals[g].subgoals). The record status keeps track of a history of
selected goals. Thus, the element g of the array status.trace is set to true to
indicate that the goal g has been selected, status.last records g as the last goal
selected, and the counter of selected goals, status.length, is increased.
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Task completion
In the user model, we consider two ways of terminating an interaction. Voluntary
completion (finished is set to ok) can occur when the main task goal, as the user
perceives it, has been achieved (see the ExitTask command). Forced termination
(finished is set to abort) models random user behaviour (see the Abort com-
mand). Since the choice between enabled guarded commands is non-deterministic,
the ExitTask action may still not be taken. Also, it is only possible when there are
no earlier commitments to other actions.
In the guarded command Abort, the condition of forced termination (no enabled
salient actions) is expressed as the negation of the predicate ExistsSalient (it
states that there exists a goal for which one of the predicates HighestSalience,
HighSalience or LowSalience is true). Note that, in such a case, a possible action
that a person could take is to wait. The user model will only do so given some
cognitively plausible reason such as a displayed “please wait” message. The waiting
conditions are represented in the model by predicate parameter Wait. If Wait is
false, finished is set to abort to model a user giving up and terminating the task.
3 Salience and Load Rules
In this section, we discuss the connection between the salience of cues and cognitive
load observed in empirical studies and expressed as salience and load rules. We
then formalise these rules within our veriﬁcation framework and incorporate them
into our cognitive architecture.
Cognitive load
Slip errors are made frequently, but they are not made every time. The frequency
of these errors is determined by causal factors internal (goals) and external to the
cognitive system. After formulating goals, new information may interfere with the
ability to retain previous formulations. We designed an experimental paradigm [2]
that manipulated the availability (and awareness) of both procedural and sensory
cues that were needed to overcome performing erroneous “springs to mind” actions.
Our hypothesis was that slip errors were more likely when the salience of cues was
not suﬃcient to actively inﬂuence attentional control. If processes are directed by a
passive (oﬀ-line) attentional control system then errors associated with performing
“springs to mind” actions are more likely. A simulation of a ‘Fire Engine Dispatch
Centre’ was developed. The overall objective was to send navigational information
to ﬁre engines enabling the fastest possible incident response times. Training trials
were used to ensure that participants became familiar with the sequence of actions
required. Cognitive load was manipulated by the complexity of routes imposed and
the quantity of task irrelevant information displayed.
We found that the diﬃculty associated with performing a proceduralized task
signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the likelihood of making a slip error. The inherent diﬃculty
of the task at hand can be referred to as intrinsic cognitive load. Our experiments
have shown that this load can inﬂuence the strength of procedural cues used to
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perform future task critical actions (background intrinsic cognitive load). Another
load type, known as extraneous load, has been shown to inﬂuence the awareness
individuals have of sensory cues when intrinsic load is high. Extraneous load is
imposed by information that does not contribute directly to the performance of
a speciﬁc goal. Activities such as attempting to ﬁnd relevant information on the
device display (visual search) or manipulating the user interface in an attempt
to ﬁnd relevant information (interactive search), that do not foster the process of
performing a goal can be classiﬁed as extraneous. Our ﬁndings suggest that sensory
cues will only be low in overall salience when both the intrinsic and extraneous load
imposed on the individual is high. These ﬁndings are compatible with Cartwright-
Finch and Lavie’s [7] theory that a high extraneous load only reduces perception of
a sensory cue (or distractor) when cognitive control functions are not available to
maintain the active goal.
The informal analysis [2] of our empirical data suggested the following connec-
tions between salience and cognitive load:
sensory When both the intrinsic and extraneous load is high, the salience of sen-
sory cues may be reduced.
procedural High intrinsic load reduces the salience of procedural cues.
Next we formalise these connections within our veriﬁcation framework.
Formalisation
In our formalisation, salience can take one of the following three values: HighSLC,
LowSLC and NoSLC, whereas both the intrinsic and extraneous load can be either
HighLD or LowLD. First, we had to capture the meaning of “reduced salience” in the
above rules. We decided to interpret this as salience going from high to low. Then
the sensory salience rule is expressed as follows:
if default = HighSLC ∧ intr = HighLD ∧ extr = HighLD
then sensory = HighSLC ∨ sensory = LowSLC
else sensory = default
(1)
Here, intr and extr represent the intrinsic and extraneous load, respectively. The
variable default denotes the salience of a sensory cue without taking into account
the cognitive load experienced, whereas sensory denotes the actual sensory salience
of that cue. Note that our formalisation is non-deterministic, i.e., we assume that a
sensory cue can be salient (and thus be noticed by people) even under the high cog-
nitive load condition. This reﬂects the modality may in the corresponding informal
rule.
In the cognitive architecture, we need a predicate that speciﬁes when the sensory
salience of a goal is high. Thus, rule (1) is translated into the following deﬁnition
of SensSalient:
SensSalient(arb,g,status,goals)(inp,mem,env) =
IF goals[g].slc(inp,mem,env) = HighSLC ∧
status.intrinsic = HighLD ∧ extraneous = HighLD
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THEN arb = HighSLC
ELSE goals[g].slc(inp,mem,env) = HighSLC ENDIF
Here, goals[g].slc(inp,mem,env) is the default salience (as determined in any
speciﬁc case by HCI experts) of the goal g. The parameter arb represents a possible
value of the actual sensory salience. This value is chosen non-deterministically as
an index of the guarded command CommitAction (see Fig. 1).
The procedural salience rule is formally expressed as follows:
if default = HighSLC ∧ intr = HighLD then procedural = LowSLC
else procedural = default
(2)
In the cognitive architecture, this is translated into two predicates, ProcHigh and
ProcLow, that specify when the procedural salience is high and low, respectively:
ProcHigh(g,status,goals)(inp,mem,env) =
goals[status.last].cue(g)(inp,mem,env) = HighSLC ∧
status.intrinsic = LowLD
ProcLow(g,status,goals)(inp,mem,env) =
goals[status.last].cue(g)(inp,mem,env) = LowSLC ∨
goals[status.last].cue(g)(inp,mem,env) = HighSLC ∧
status.intrinsic = HighLD
Hierarchy of choices
Next we discuss how the sensory and procedural salience inﬂuence the choice of
goals in our cognitive architecture. Recall that the underlying choice principle is
non-determinism – any “enabled” goal can be chosen for execution. The addition
of salience reﬁnes the notion of enabledness by introducing a hierarchy of choices
into our cognitive architecture. We started with a version that included a two-
level hierarchy, high salience and low salience. A goal was deﬁned to have the high
salience, if either of the predicates SensSalient or ProcHigh was true, otherwise
its salience was deﬁned as low. We also assumed that high salience goals have
priority over low salience ones. However, with this version of the architecture, our
veriﬁcation eﬀorts described in Section 5 produced errors (and the corresponding
behaviours of the model) not observed during our empirical studies. The analysis
of the counter examples suggested a reﬁnement of the two-level hierarchy which
yielded a new version speciﬁed in Fig. 2.
The new version consists of three levels of salience. Assuming the choice strategy
and the guard for an atomic goal is true, its salience belongs to the highest level, if
(i) its procedural salience is high, or (ii) its procedural salience is low, and sensory
salience is high (see Fig. 2). It belongs to the middle level (high salience), if it is
not procedurally cued, but its sensory salience is high. Such a goal is only chosen,
if there are no goals in the highest level. Finally, the lowest level includes all the
remaining atomic goals whose choice strategy and guard are true.
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HighestSalience(arb,g,status,goals)(inp,mem,env) =
atom?(goals[g].subgoals) ∧
goals[g].grd(inp,mem,env) ∧ goals[g].choice(g,s) ∧
(ProcHigh(g,status,goals)(inp,mem,env) ∨
ProcLow(g,status,goals)(inp,mem,env) ∧
SensSalient(arb,g,status,goals)(inp,mem,env))
HighSalience(arb,g,status,goals)(inp,mem,env) =
atom?(goals[g].subgoals) ∧
goals[g].grd(inp,mem,env) ∧ goals[g].choice(g,s) ∧
goals[status.last].cue(g)(inp,mem,env) = NoSLC ∧
SensSalient(arb,g,status,goals)(inp,mem,env)
LowSalience(arb,g,status,goals)(inp,mem,env) =
atom?(goals[g].subgoals) ∧
goals[g].grd(inp,mem,env) ∧ goals[g].choice(g,s)
Fig. 2. Levels of salience
Fig. 3. ‘Fire Engine Dispatch’ interface
4 Fire Engine Dispatch Task
In this section, we describe the task we chose to model for the assessment of our
development of the cognitive architecture.
The overall objective of the task was to send navigational information to ﬁre
engines enabling the fastest possible incident response times using the interface
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shown in Fig. 3. When commencing the task an individual has to decide which call
to prioritize before clicking on the ‘Start next call’ button. Choosing call priority
involves clicking on the radio button that is located alongside the required call ID
(see the bottom right part of Fig. 3). However, call priority is actually set only when
the ‘Conﬁrm priority change’ button is clicked. Clicking on this button updates the
visual conﬁrmation of the selected call, located at the top of the priority selection
window (ID 4 in Fig. 3). The selected call is then processed by clicking on the ‘Start
next call’ button.
The second part of this task is to construct the optimal route and send the
necessary information to ﬁre engines. This is done using the bottom left part of the
interface from Fig. 3 which is displayed only when a call has been processed. At this
point, the location of the nearest ﬁre engine and the location of the incident are
displayed as waypoints on the map in the upper part of the interface. Depending
on the availability of GPS signals, there are two options for constructing route
information: automatic and manual. The most appropriate automatically generated
route could only be used when GPS signals are being received by the ﬁre engine
attending the incident. When GPS signals cannot be relied upon, a route must
be constructed based on waypoint information in the local area. The indicator
located above the telephone image informs which option must be used. The leftmost
drop-down menu supports manual route construction by allowing the user to select
waypoints and add them to the route by clicking on the ‘Add’ button. The selected
waypoints are then displayed in the text box below. One of the automatically
generated routes can be selected by clicking on the menu just above the ‘Add’
button. Selecting the wrong route construction method is regarded as a mode
error.
The constructed route is sent by clicking the ‘Get/Send route information’ but-
ton, thus ﬁnishing the task. However, before this step is taken, a ﬁre engine des-
ignated as the backup unit must be selected. This selection involves clicking the
radio button alongside one of the units in the centrally located menu. Again the
backup unit is only set once the ‘Route complete’ button has been clicked.
5 Task Veriﬁcation
In this section, we instantiate our generic architecture, thus deriving a user model
for the ‘Fire Engine Dispatch Task’. This model is then used for the veriﬁcation of
correctness properties for the interface described in the previous section. 6
In this paper, we consider one usability property. It aims to ensure that, in any
possible system behaviour, the user’s main goal of interaction (as they perceive it)
is eventually achieved. This is written in SAL as the following LTL assertion (here
F means “eventually”):
F(Perceived(inp, mem, env))(3)
6 The complete SAL sources for this example, including the SAL speciﬁcation of the interface, are available
at http://www.dcs.qmul.ac.uk/research/imc/hum/examples/fmis07.zip .
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The main purpose of our veriﬁcation is to ﬁnd out how close, with respect to the
errors detected, its results are to the data of our empirical studies. Since the actual
experiments essentially consisted of two subtasks, we split the task (and its user
model) into two parts: setting call priority (top goal PriorityGoal) and sending
route information (top goal RouteGoal).
5.1 Call Priority
We assume that the user model for this (sub)task includes three atomic goals:
SelectPriorityGoal, ConfirmPriorityGoal and StartCallGoal. As an example,
SelectPriorityGoal is the following record:
choice := NotYetDischarged
grd := λ(inp,mem,env):inp.PrioritySelection
slc := λ(inp,mem,env):HighSLC
cue := λ(g):λ(inp,mem,env):
IF g = ConfirmPriorityGoal THEN HighSLC ELSE NoSLC ENDIF
subgoals := atom(SelectPriority)
Thus, this goal may be selected only if the priority selection menu is displayed.
The choice strategy NotYetDischarged is a pre-deﬁned predicate that allows one
to choose a goal only when it has not been chosen before. We assume that the
sensory salience of this goal is high, since the visual attention, at this point in task
execution, should be in the correct area. The salience of this goal as a procedural
cue for the call conﬁrmation action is high, but it should not cue other actions. The
corresponding action SelectPriority is deﬁned as follows:
tout := λ(inp,out0,mem):λ(out):
out = Default WITH .PrioritySelected:= TRUE
tmem := λ(inp,mem0,out):λ(mem):
mem = mem0 WITH .PrioritySelected:= TRUE
Here Default is a record with all its ﬁelds set to false thus asserting that nothing
else is done.
The deﬁnitions for the other two goals are similar. Their sensory salience is
assumed to be high. ConfirmPriorityGoal serves as a procedural cue of high
salience for the goal StartCallGoal, whereas the latter being the last step in the
procedure does not cue other actions. Finally, the top goal PriorityGoal for the
call priority subtask is deﬁned as follows:
load := λ(inp,mem,env):LowLD
achieved := λ(inp,mem,env):inp.WaitMsg
subgoals :=
comp({SelectPriorityGoal,ConfirmPriorityGoal,StartCallGoal})
It includes all three atomic goals as its subgoals. Since setting call priority is a
cognitively simple procedure, we assume that the intrinsic load for this task is low.
Finally, the component achieved deﬁnes the perceived goal of the task. The latter
is regarded as achieved when a wait message is displayed by the interface. This only
R. Rukše˙nas et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 208 (2008) 57–7570
happens once the processing of the selected call has been started. Note that the
interface speciﬁcation ensures that this state can never be reached, if the priority
setting procedure was not properly (as described in Section 4) executed.
The user model derived by the above instantiation of the generic architecture is
parametric with respect to the extraneous load. This parameter can be manipulated
in diﬀerent veriﬁcation runs, similarly as was done in the empirical studies.
Veriﬁcation
For both extraneous load conditions, veriﬁcation of property (3) fails. The
counter examples indicate that the user model starts by immediately executing
StartCallGoal. This corresponds to the empirical studies which found this initial-
isation error to be systematic. Its main cognitive cause is that the required action of
choosing priority is the ﬁrst one in the procedure, and thus is not procedurally cued.
This suggests that the initialisation error is unlikely to be eliminated by increasing
the sensory salience of the relevant menu options. On the other hand, “sequencing”
the interface so that the ‘Start next call’ button becomes available only when call
priority has been set should eliminate this error. Veriﬁcation of the task with a
modiﬁed interface conﬁrms this.
Next we check whether the task goal is achieved assuming the ﬁrst step was
taken correctly. This is expressed as a slightly modiﬁed property (3):
X(commit[SelectPriorityAction]=committed)⇒ F(Perceived(inp,mem,env))
Here X is the LTL operator “next”. The property states that the task goal is
eventually achieved, if the ﬁrst thing that the user model does is committing to
SelectPriorityAction. Veriﬁcation of the modiﬁed usability property is successful
for both extraneous load conditions. Again, this corresponds to the results of our
empirical studies which found that the action of conﬁrming priority is almost never
omitted presumably due to its high procedural cueing by the previous action of
selecting priority. Next we consider the second subtask.
5.2 Sending Route Information
We assume that the user model for this (sub)task includes the following atomic goals:
ObserveModeGoal, GPSGoal, ManualGoal, ClickAddGoal, SelectBackupGoal,
ConfirmRouteGoal and SendRouteGoal. For the goal of observing the mode in-
dicator (ObserveModeGoal), the essential components are speciﬁed as follows:
grd := λ(inp,mem,env):inp.ModeDisplayed = NoMode
slc := λ(inp,mem,env):LowSLC
cue := λ(g):λ(inp,mem,env):
IF g = GPSGoal ∨ g = ManualGoal THEN HighSLC ELSE NoSLC ENDIF
Here ModeDisplayed denotes the required mode for route construction. It can take
one of the following three values: ModeGPS, ModeManual and NoMode. This goal
can only be selected when the mode indicator is displayed and shows the required
mode. The sensory salience of ObserveModeGoal is low, since the mode indica-
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tor is displayed in a diﬀerent area from the route construction menus. Observing
the mode indicator is a highly salient procedural cue for both automatic and man-
ual route construction goals, ModeGPS and ManualGoal, respectively. Finally, the
memory update for ObserveModeAction speciﬁes that the indicated mode of route
construction is stored in memory:
tmem := λ(inp,mem0,out):λ(mem):
mem = mem0 WITH .mode:= inp.ModeDisplayed
Similarly, the essential components for SelectBackupGoal are deﬁned as fol-
lows:
grd := λ(inp,mem,env):inp.BackupSelection
slc := λ(inp,mem,env):HighSLC
cue := λ(g):λ(inp,mem,env):
IF g = ConfirmRouteGoal THEN HighSLC ELSE NoSLC ENDIF
Note that selecting a backup unit is a highly salient procedural cue for clicking the
‘Route complete’ button (ConfirmRouteGoal).
Finally, for the top goal RouteGoal of the subtask of sending route we have the
following deﬁnitions:
load := intrinsic
achieved := λ(inp,mem,env):inp.SuccessMsg
cue := λ(g):λ(inp,mem,env):
IF g = ObserveModeGoal THEN LowSLC ELSE NoSLC ENDIF
subgoals :=
comp({ObserveModeGoal,GPSGoal,ManualGoal,ClickAddGoal,
SelectBackupGoal,ConfirmRouteGoal,SendRouteGoal})
The variable intrinsic is a parameter of our user model. It denotes the intrinsic
load associated with the route construction procedure and depends on the construc-
tion method required. As previously, the model is also parametric with respect to
the extraneous load. The perceived task goal is to send route information. Achieving
this goal is indicated by a success message displayed by the interface. RouteGoal is
a lowly salient procedural cue for observing the mode indicator (ObserveModeGoal).
Note that the latter is actually cued by the action of starting a new call, which ends
the ﬁrst subtask. Since the whole dispatch task is split into two subtasks, the pro-
cedural cue for ObserveModeGoal is speciﬁed to be the top goal RouteGoal of the
second subtask. We assume that the salience of this cueing is low, since the mode
indicator is displayed after some delay during which a person is likely to be engaged
in a complex process relevant to the route identiﬁcation and construction.
Veriﬁcation
As mentioned in Section 3, initially we used a hierarchy with two salience levels.
For this version of the cognitive architecture, veriﬁcation of property (3) produced
erroneous behaviours that were not observed in the empirical studies. Namely,
after selecting the backup unit, the user model was executing SendRouteAction
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instead of ConfirmRouteAction which is procedurally cued with high salience by
SelectBackupAction. This lead to the introduction of additional salience level,
prioritising the goals with high procedural salience (e.g., ConfirmRouteAction)
over those whose sensory salience is high (e.g., SendRouteAction). The modiﬁed
version of the cognitive architecture was used for further veriﬁcation.
To simplify the analysis of the counter examples produced, we introduced two
additional correctness properties:
G(mem.RouteConstructed⇒ (mem.mode = NoMode))(4)
G((out.ConfirmRoute∨ out.SendRoute)⇒ mem.BackupSelected)(5)
The ﬁrst one is relevant to the mode error and states that the memory component
RouteConstructed (updated by GPSAction and ClickAddAction) can only be true,
if the user model attended to the mode indicator and stored its value in mem.mode.
The second property states that the buttons ‘Conﬁrm Route’ and ‘Get/Send Route’
can only be clicked, if a backup unit has been selected (indicated by the memory
component BackupSelected which is updated by SelectBackupGoal. It is relevant
in the situations when the action of selecting backup is omitted (termination error).
We start with property (4). Its veriﬁcation fails for all load conditions: the
user model omits the action of attending to the mode indicator. These results are
inconsistent with respect to the empirical studies which found that only both the in-
trinsic and extraneous load being high leads to the systematic mode error. However,
these inconsistencies are false positives. Our veriﬁcation did not miss erroneous be-
haviours. Rather, it indicated problems that were not seen in speciﬁc experiment
when this task was performed by humans. This suggests that our salience and load
rules and/or the hierarchy of salience levels need further reﬁnements. We intend to
explore this in future work.
Next we verify property (5) relevant to the termination error. In this case, the
correlation with the empirical data is closer. For all load conditions but intrinsic
being high and extraneous being low, veriﬁcation of (5) yields the same results as
the empirical studies. In the case when both the intrinsic and the extraneous load
is high the omission of selecting backup is observed. When the intrinsic load is low
veriﬁcation of (5) is successful. This corresponds to low error rates for these load
conditions in our empirical studies (non-systematic error). On the other hand, the
single mismatch occurring when the intrinsic load is high and the extraneous load is
low is potentially more serious than previous false positives. In this case, veriﬁcation
is successful, even though our empirical data indicates a systematic error.
One possible explanation for this mismatch is that our judgement about salience
values for some goals was inappropriate. In fact, veriﬁcation yields the termination
error when, for SelectBackupGoal, the salience of procedural cueing is set to high
and the sensory salience is set to low (in the original speciﬁcation, these values
were low and high, respectively). Furthermore, the new value for procedural cueing
could be reasonably argued for, though admittedly the new value for the sensory
salience is probably more diﬃcult to defend. Another possible explanation is that
our rules are simply too coarse. Whichever the case may be further experiments
are necessary.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we added to our cognitive architecture the concepts of procedural
and sensory salience. We formalised the connection between both salience types
and cognitive load imposed by the complexity of the task performed. We then
reﬁned the underlying principle of non-deterministic choice of goals by introducing
a hierarchy of choices governed by the salience of goals. Veriﬁcation attempts using
the new version of the cognitive architecture suggested further reﬁnements to the
hierarchy of salience levels.
As an assessment step for these developments, we undertook the formal mod-
elling of the ﬁre engine dispatch task used in our empirical studies. Our goal was to
check the consistency between the behaviours generated by our cognitive architec-
ture and those exhibited by human participants of our experiments. We found that,
with respect to the initialisation error, veriﬁcation yielded results that are consistent
with the human behaviour observed during the experimental studies. For the mode
error, our veriﬁcation produced false positives in some cases. On the other hand,
in the single case when the intrinsic load is high and the extraneous load is low,
veriﬁcation missed the termination error found to be systematic in the experiments.
The inconsistencies shown in the results of the formal veriﬁcation and the exper-
iment in no way reduce the signiﬁcance of our work. Rather they warrant further
reﬁnements of our formal rules and new empirical studies. In fact, this provides
a good example of the cyclic nature of our research methodology. The results of
our original experiment have led us to informal salience and cognitive load rules.
Since those results have been obtained by manipulation of factors (cognitive and
perceptual load) that are known to apply to other domains [20,12,13], we expect
our rules to be generic. Their formalisation and the subsequent formal veriﬁcation
raise some questions and suggest new experimental hypotheses. These hypotheses
need to be tested in future experiments that will allow us further reﬁne our rules
and again assess them in formal veriﬁcation.
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